William & Mary Law Review
Volume 18 (1976-1977)
Issue 2 Symposium: Philosophy of Law

Article 5

December 1976

Justice and Legal Reasoning
William T. Blackstone

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Part of the Jurisprudence Commons

Repository Citation
William T. Blackstone, Justice and Legal Reasoning, 18 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 321 (1976),
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol18/iss2/5
Copyright c 1976 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship
Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr

JUSTICE AND LEGAL REASONING
WILLIAM T. BLACKSTONE*

This Article analyzes the requisite structure of proper judicial
reasoning and the freedoms allowed in judicial decision-making
within that structure. The primary emphasis is on "hard" cases,
with the sorts of issues and the mode of reasoning in complex appellate court decisions. Simplistic formal or mechanical decisions in
which a clear cut rule of law is applied to a given case pose no great
philosophical problems for jurisprudential reasoning; hard cases can
pose such problems. They go beyond simple mechanical decisionmaking procedures and involve conflicts of righis and principles,
interpretations of rights and principles, and decisions on priorities
of rights and principles. They go not only to fundamental issues of
constitutional interpretation but to fundamental moral issues as
well.
This Article will develop an account of judicial reasoning that
both explains some of the inherent complexities of that reasoning
and points to criteria to which such reasoning should conform.' In
Section I, I will discuss these complexities and some criteria will
be formulated. In Section H, DeFunis v. Odegaard2 will be examined as a point of reference for further analysis of those complexities
and criteria. In Section I, some conclusions on criteria of adequacy
for judicial reasoning will be drawn.
I.

CRITERIA OF ADEQUACY FOR LEGAL REASONING

The quest for criteria to which legal reasoning should conform
should be understandable, given the power and pervasive influence
of laws and legal institutions. If Ralf Dahrendorf is correct, and I
believe he is, the law is the basic factor that determines the sorts of
social stratification or class structures that exist in different soci* B.A., Elon College; M.A., Ph.D., Duke University. Research Professor of Philosophy and
Chairman, Division of Social Sciences, University of Georgia.

1. This Article is not concerned with the psychology of judicial decision making, what
causes judges to decide a particular way. Nor is the Article concerned with simply explicating
or describing the sorts of considerations to which judges appeal in making decisions, though
such an explication is important to understanding the judicial process.
2. 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
3. The overall discussion assumes a division of powers characteristic of the United States.

Different functions or roles might be proper to a judiciary under a different form of government.
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ties.' If the law embodies irrelevant criteria or if it legitimizes arbitrary discriminations or if it permits such discrimination, then the
law is an instrument of social injustice. We would like to believe
that all legal decisions are rationally justified and that they are
proper uses of state power, but we know that they are not. We are
all aware that some laws, judicial decisions, and prevailing social
conditions are irrational and unjust. We are made acutely aware of
this when there is a radical alteration in the law, for example, when
an important precedent is overruled. The Supreme Court's decision
in Brown v. Board of Education,5 which overruled Plessy v.
Ferguson,' is an example of such a radical alteration in judicial
reasoning. Such cases set new precedents and offer new guidelines
for future legal decisions and lead us to ask why acts or conditions
that previously were seen as legal and just now are seen as illegal
and unjust. The answer to this question will vary according to context. Some considerations, however, are context-independent criteria that any adequate judicial decision must meet.
First, logical consistency in decisions is a criterion that is necessary but by no means sufficient for an adequate judicial decision. If
there are two cases under consideration by a judge and those cases
in all relevant respects are indistinguishable, and if a judge or court
decides one case in one way and the other case differently, then
something basic to the judicial process is wrong. Such decisions are
arbitrary and capricious. To use the language of both Herbert
Wechsler7 and R.M. Hare,' they are unprincipled. Consistency or
the principled nature of judicial decisions does not mean, however,
that all cases arising after a given precedent has been made must
be decided identically. This would be required only if (a) there were
no relevant differences between the cases and (b) if the legal precedent itself covered all relevant grounds for differentiation and was
based on relevant grounds. These two conditions require detailed
examination.
(a) Few would deny that stare decisis is essential to judicial
decision-making. Without attention to precedents and the effort to
4. Dahrendorf, On the Origin of Social Inequality, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY
(2d Series, P. Lastett & W. Runciman ed. 1962), reprinted in THE CONCEPT OF EQUALITY (W.
Blackstone ed. 1969).
5. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
6. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
7. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959);
Wechsler, The Nature of JudicialReasoning, in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY (S. Hook ed. 1964).
8. R. HARE, THE LANGUAGE OF MORALS (1952) (especially Chapter 4).
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make legal decisions consistent, judicial decisions would be based
on the immediate results of a decision and on the moral and political
commitments of the judge. But within the commitment to stare
decisis, judges have considerable room for movement and creativity.
This is so not merely because there are contradictory precedents but
because changing conditions of human life and new knowledge
make certain factors relevant that were not relevant or were not seen
as relevant at an earlier time. The object of judicial reasoning is
justice and equity, and judges must attend to all considerations
relevant to just and equitable decisions. This means that they must
be prepared not merely to apply a given law mechanically in the
light of certain precedents but to extend those laws and precedents
creatively to cover considerations now relevant to just decisions, and
to assure equity in individual cases when the facts do not precisely
fit the mold of precedents. In this sense the judiciary is an extension
of the legislature.
For example, until quite recently judicial decisions bearing on the
disposal of wastes by industries have been made largely on the basis
of the right to private property and old "public nuisance" law. Such
decisions perhaps were adequate during an era of abundant clean
natural resources, but under current conditions, with the growth of
industry and technology and the devastating effect of uncontrolled
pollutant disposal on the environment and on the quality of human
life, many argue that they are no longer adequate. If judges simply
create new law by formulating what they think public policy ought

to be on pollutant disposal, for instance, they would intrude on
legislative prerogatives. Of course, in the past five years, legislative
bodies have acted in this area. Literally thousands of new environmental laws have appeared. I am suggesting, however, that a judge
might extend creatively the application of old laws to new and
changing conditions, even without new legislation, as occurred with
the Refuse Act of 1899.1 This forward-looking extension of existing
law is a fulfillment, not a violation, of the judge's role.'"
In the context of moral philosophy, Hare makes this point of the
proper extension of principles very well: "[W]e are always setting
precedents for ourselves. It is not a case of the principle settling
everything down to a certain point, and decision dealing with every9. 33 U.S.C. 407 (1970). For a discussion see Blackstone, Ethics and Ecology, in PHILOAND THE ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS (W. Blackstone ed. 1974).
10. This sort of forward-looking extension should not be confused with the use of some sort
of utilitarian calculus as a guide.
SOPHY
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thing below that point. Rather, decision and principles interact
throughout the whole field."" Judicial reasoning would seem to conform to this principle. Legal principles and precedents are modified
constantly by judicial decisions, and unquestionably, just as the
interaction of decision and principle is necessary for the growth of
morality and the adequacy of moral decisions, so also is the interaction of decision, principle, and precedents in the realm of legal
reasoning required for the growth and vitality of law and the adequacy of legal decisions. In both areas, however, we must be able to
offer justified reasons for the extension of a principle or rule, or for
permitting a certain case or type of case to be an exception to the
rule, and we must be willing to apply the extended or altered principle to all similar cases to avoid an unprincipled decision.
(b) Judges must be prepared not only to extend principles to
apply to new conditions, but also to recognize that established legal
principles or rules may be based on irrelevant or arbitrary criteria
for the differential treatment of persons or groups. The principled
application of such rules results in grave injustice. This, of course,
is the whole point of those who cry for justice rather than mere law
and order or uniform treatment. Laws that discriminate or permit
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, or age when these criteria
are irrelevant are examples of principled but unjust order. The relevance of criteria, however, cannot always be spelled out in advance. New empirical knowledge of factors causally related to certain ends or purposes properly force reconsideration of laws or precedents that distribute goods and services on grounds that did not
take this knowledge into account. Plessy v. Ferguson is a case in
point. That decision was predicated on the assumption that separate but equal schooling facilities for whites and blacks was possible.' 2 The sociological and psychological data uncovered by Kenneth
Clark and others,' 3 which was an important empirical premise in the
overturning of Plessy, showed that the mere separation by race,
even with comparable school facilities and faculties, precluded
11. HARE, supra note 8, at 65.
12. 163 U.S. at 544-45.
13. K. CLARK, EFFECT OF PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION ON PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT
(1950); E. FRAZIER, THE NEGRO IN THE UNITED STATES (1949); PERSONALITY IN THE MAKING (H.

Witmer ed. 1952); Brameld, Educational Costs, in DISCRIMINATION AND NATIONAL WELFARE
(Maclver ed. 1949); Chein, What Are the PsychologicalEffects of Segregation Under Conditions of Equal Facilities?, 3 INT'L. J. OPINION AND ATrITUDE RES. 229 (1949); Deutcher &
Chein, The Psychological Effects of Enforced Segregation: A Survey of Social Science
Opinion, 26 J. PSYCH. 259 (1948), cited in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 n.11
(1954).
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equality of educational opportunity, in direct contradiction to the
rationale of Plessy.
What constitutes justified reasons for exceptions and extensions
of principles? There is no simple answer to this question. It surely
depends on the context and circumstances within which the principle or law operates; on the purpose of the law and whether its application is accomplishing that purpose; t on the precedents set; on the
uncovering of new empirical data; on whether the law conflicts with
other laws; on the interpretation of broad constitutional rights and
values; on the hierarchy of principles adopted when there is such
conflict. In difficult cases judges can and do diverge in their decisions because of disagreement at any one or more of these levels.
These disagreements are manifest in those areas of judicial discretion which judges are permitted to exercise. Although a judge's
decision must be consistent with procedural and substantive law,
that law permits a wide range of choice both "horizontally," in
terms of different statutes and precedents, and "vertically," in
terms of the variety of constitutional rights and principles.' 5 In any
given case, the judge must decide first by classifying the case under
a certain legal category, which may already indicate the statutes
and precedents he deems relevant, and at the trial level, by operating on the basis of certain rules concerning the admissibility of
evidence. These moves restrict the boundaries within which his
judgment will be formulated. For example, as Iredell Jenkins points
out, the decision to classify a case as one of "contributory negligence," or "failure to take due care," or "assumption of risk," or "of
extra hazardous use," sets the framework for decision. 6 In any given
case, which of the similarities among the elements of the cases is the
essential one? The choice of legal categories for the resolution of the
case, for example, depends on the answer to this question. Once that
choice is made, however, the judge has wide room for movement
both horizontally and vertically. His role as judge restricts the
grounds for his decision to the legal framework of his society. His
decision must follow logically from the laws and precedents of that
system, but, as indicated, this leaves room for a great deal of judi14. For an interesting analysis ofjudicial "means-end scrutiny" see Gunther, The Supreme
Court, 1971 Term. Foreword:In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 18 (1972).
15. For a discussion of these types of choices see G. GOTTUEB, THE LOGIC OF CHOICE 134
(1968).
16. Jenkins, The Framework of Legal Decision.Making, in LEGAL REASONING: PROCEEDINGS
OF THE WORLD CONGRESS FOR LEGAL AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 291 (1971).
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cial creativeness (or, as some say, "judicial legislation"). This ex-

pectation of judicial creativeness within the circumscribed bounds
of the legal system raises the question of what is embraced by that
system. What types of rules or principles or considerations are seen
as properly constitutive of the legal framework within which the
judge is to make his decisions? That issue will be discussed momentarily, for it is central to the object of explicating criteria of adequacy for judicial reasoning. First, a discussion of judicial creativeness or what some call judicial legislation is apposite.
Justice or a just decision often requires judicial creativeness-the
extension of legal categories and perhaps the creation of new categories of judicial relevance. If justice is to be served, new conditions
of human life, and new information about those conditions bearing
on the quality of human life and the just distribution of goods and
services require legal innovation and new interpretations and applications of established laws and principles. In this sense judicial
"legislation" is required of judges. As Sam Shuman has pointed
out, however, this is legislation of a certain type, and is not to be

confused with the role of the political legislator. 7 The political legislator is not bound by the doctrine of stare decisis; the judge is. The
political legislator is directly accountable to the people. His adequacy as a legislator is assessed in terms of the immediate social
consequences of the laws for which he is responsible. Also, the
political legislator legitimately can favor his own political constituents; indeed, he is expected to do so. On the other hand, the judge
has no political constituents whom he is expected or entitled to
favor. The adequacy of his decisions is not tested solely by their
immediate social consequences; nor, generally, is the judge directly
accountable to the people.18 These differences are important. The
role of the judge is circumscribed in this way in our system because
we think it is required for impartial, just decisions. This seems to
be correct; justice is not likely to result from a straightforward political advocate. If so-called judicial "legislation" is seen for what it
is, as the creative extension of laws and principles to assure justice
under changing conditions of human life and proper attention to the

unique circumstances of individual cases, we certainly should not
17. Shuman, Judicial Legislation or In What Way Is Relevance Relevant to Judicial
Decision-Making, in LEGAL REASONING: PROCEEDINGS OF THE WORLD CONGRESS FOR LEGAL AND
SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 390-91 (1971).

18. For a discussion of other important differences between the judge as legislator and the
political legislator see id. at 390.
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have a negative attitude toward it, for it is proper to the role of a
judge. A simple mechanical application of laws without the creative
extension and interpretation of those laws results in injustice and
vitiates a basic raison d'6tre of the judge.
Some distinctions by Ronald Dworkin are useful in the criteriological quest. In arguing against legal positivism, even in the sophisticated form held by H.L.A. Hart," Dworkin notes:
When lawyers reason or dispute about legal rights and obligations, particulary in those hard cases when our problems with
these concepts seem most acute, they make use of standards that
do not function as rules, but operate differently as principles,
policies, and other sorts of standards. Positivism, I shall argue,
is a model of and for a system of rules, and its central notion of a
single fundamental test for law forces us to miss the important
roles of these standards that are not rules."
What does Dworkin mean by a legal rule? How does a rule differ
from a legal principle or a policy? Though Dworkin admits that it
is sometimes difficult to distinguish rules and principles because
they sometimes play the same role, 21 nonetheless there is a logical
distinction between them. "Rules are applicable in an all-ornothing-fashion. If the facts a rule stipulates are given, then either
the rule is valid, in which case the answer it supplies must be accepted, or it is not, in which case it contributes nothing to the
decision. 22 For example, it is a rule that a will is invalid unless it
is signed by three witnesses. If this rule is valid, any will signed by
only two witnesses is invalid unless there are specified exceptions
which themselves are part of the rule.n
A principle, on the other hand, is not an all-or-nothing sort of
thing. It "does not even purport to set out conditions that make its
application necessary." 2 It does not require a particular decision
but is a consideration "which officials must take into account, if it
is relevant, as a consideration inclining in one direction or another. 12 5 Dworkin cites several examples of principles. In Riggs v.
19. H. HAinr, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).

20. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CH. L. REv. 14, 22 (1967).
21. In some cases, according to Dworkin, "the difference between them is almost a matter
of form alone." Id. at 28.
22. Id. at 25.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 26.
25. Id.
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Palmer," the court had to decide whether a person who had murdered his grandfather could inherit the wealth left him in his grandfather's will. The court recognized that the
"statutes regulating the making, proof and effect of wills . . . if
literally construed

. . .

give this property to the murderer". But

the court continued to note that "all laws as well as all contracts
may be controlled in their operation and effect by general, fundamental maxims of the common law. No one shall be permitted
to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong,
or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime."27
This principle overrode the rule and the murderer was not permitted
to inherit under the will.
Another example of a principle cited by Dworkin is the decision
in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,21 a landmark case in
products liability. Henningsen signed a contract limiting the automobile manufacturer's liability to "making good" defective parts.
After an accident caused by a defective part, he sued the manufacturer for medical costs and other expenses of those injured. A simple
appeal to legal rules would have permitted the manufacturer to
stand on the contract, but the court held for Henningsen, citing
principles such as, "'the courts generally refuse to lend themselves
to the enforcement of a 'bargain' in which one party has unjustly
taken advantage of the economic necessities of the other,' " and
"[in a society such as ours, where the automobile is a common and
necessary adjunct of daily life, and where its use is so fraught with
danger to the driver, passengers and the public, the manufacturer
is under a special obligation in connection with the construction,
promotion and sale of his cars."3 Again the principles overrode the
rule. The defendant had to pay for medical costs although this
conclusion was not necessitated by the principle.
Dworkin defines a principle as "a standard that is to be observed,
not because it will advance or secure an economic, political, or social
situation deemed desirable, but because it is a requirement of
26. 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889).
27. Dworkin, supra note 14, at 23-24, quoting Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511, 22 N.E.
188, 190 (1889).
28. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d. 69 (1960).

29. Id. at -,
161 A.2d.at 86, quoting United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S.
289, 326 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at
, 161 A.2d at 85. For Dworkin's analysis of Henningsen see Dworkin, supra
note 14, at 24.
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justice or fairness or some other dimension of morality."', Principles
are characterized by the dimension of weight or importance; rules
are not. Additionally, in cases involving several principles,
resolution requires the assignment of relative weights to each. Of
course, it does not follow from these differences that rules do not
often result from the application of principles.
Policies, on the other hand, differ from principles for they are
standards "that [set] out a goal to be reached, generally an improvement in some economic, political, or social feature of the community."32 The formulation of policy is basically the function of the
legislative branch and the judiciary must "pay a qualified deference
to the acts of the legislature."3
Dworkin argues that rules and principles, rather than policies, are
the legitimate and authoritative sources for judicial decisions.-"
Principles, however, cannot be applied mechanically. They are
open-textured and controversial; because men may assign different
weights to them, reasonable men may disagree on the appropriateness of any given legal decision based on those principles. This does
not mean that the framework for judicial reasoning is unstructured
or that it is based on the biased evaluation or the idiosyncratic value
commitments of the judge. It means only that the structure is much
looser and more complex than a narrow rule-oriented model depicts
to be possible. This looser structure does not nullify the fact of
structure. For example, debates in the Supreme Court and changes
in legal opinions-the overturning of precedents-do not indicate a
lack of authority in our basic law. On the contrary they indicate, as
Robert Goedecke puts it, that "authority is reasonable and not totally blind."35 If the Court did not respond to changing conditions
and new information or if it did not interpret and apply constitutional rights and principles to new conditions of human life, it would
surely vitiate a major purpose for its existence.
Goedecke speaks of an "open formalism" as the most adequate
theory for jurisprudence. This is similar to what Hare is referring to
31. Dworkin, supra note 14, at 23.
32. Id. Dworkin recognizes that the distinction between principles and policies "can be
collapsed by construing a principle as stating a social goal" but he believes that we lose a
valuable distinction in some contexts when this is done. Id.
33. Id. at 38.
34. Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1975). In this complex and brilliant essay
Professor Dworkin extends his analysis of the distinctions between rules and principles and
policies which he first formulated in The Model of Rules, supra notes 20-32.
35. R. GOEDECKE, CHANCE AND THE LAW 214 (1969).
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in moral philosophy when he speaks of "decisions of principle," 3
and it seems to be the basic thrust of Dworkin's emphasis on a
jurisprudence of principles as opposed to one which is simply ruleoriented or policy-oriented. Both Goedecke and Hare emphasize a
framework in which basic principles are applied and extended in
light of current conditions and the particularities of concrete cases.
If we emphasize only current conditions and needs by adopting a
purely pragmatic jurisprudence, we flounder in a morass of individual preferences, values, and attitudes, and we usurp the role of the
legislature by judicially creating social goals and policies. If we emphasize only formal rules, we are left with a sterile legal system that
will fail to meet the needs of a changing society.
Principles, and the rights founded on those principles, must occupy center stage in the judicial process. There are, of course, different levels of generality of principles, ranging from principles like "no
man may profit from his own wrong" to the equal protection and
due process clauses of the Constitution. But the substance of judicial decision at whatever level of adjudication depends heavily on
the decision that certain principles are relevent; on the weight given
to different, sometimes conflicting, principles; and on the interpretation given to those principles. There are, then, at least two basic
issues when we speak of "principled" judicial decisions: (1) The
proper interpretation of whatever principle or principles are involved in a decision, and (2) a priority ordering of those principles.
I will focus on (1) in Section II, using DeFunis as a point of reference. First, a discussion of issue (2) is required.
It has been argued that since the mid-forties, the Supreme Court
has embraced the "balancing" doctrine in which competing principles, values, and interests are "weighed" and in which the judgment of each case rests on the particular nature of the case. Whether
or not this is true, the basic objection to this balancing doctrine has
been that it results in ad hoc decisions rather than principled ones.3"
When decisions are based largely on current needs and on the
subjective value preferences of the judge in his choice of both the
relevance and weight of principles, no objective principles are invoked or established. Justice Black, who has expressed great concern over what he thinks are ad hoc decisions of the Court, stated:
36. See note 8 supra & accompanying text.
37. See generally Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLau', 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1959).
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"It is neither natural nor unavoidable in this country for the fundamental rights of the people to be dependent upon the different emphasis different judges put upon different values at different
times."3 "Balancing" must not be ad hoc. It must be done, Justice
Black argues, within the preferred position of rights which the framers of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights provided. When
there is a conflict of rights or liberties all of which are protected by
the Constitution, we must settle the conflict by appealing to the
preferred position given to certain rights by the Constitution. Justice Black is adamant and unequivocal about the fundamental status of first amendment rights. They have preferred status in the
Constitution, he argues, and are not to be treated simply as part of
a cluster of rights that must be balanced against other rights, including the interests of government. 9 Justice Douglas expressed the
same concern as Justice Black over the ad hoc, unprincipled nature
of some recent court decisions:
[R]ecently the Court in this and in other cases has engrafted the
right of regulation onto the First Amendment by placing in the
hands of the legislative branch the right to regulate 'within reasonable limits' the right of free speech. This to me is an ominous
and alarming trend. The free trade in ideas which the Framers
of the Constitution visualized disappears. In its place there is
substituted a new orthodoxy-an orthodoxy that changes with
the whims of the age or the day, an orthodoxy which the majority
by solemn judgment proclaims to be essential to the safety, welfare, security, morality, or health of society. Free speech in the
constitutional sense disappears."
If Justices Black and Douglas are correct, the preferred status of
certain rights in the Constitution provides the basis for principled,
as opposed to ad hoc, decisions by the Court. This does not mean
that those rights are absolute, for their preferred status could be
changed by additional constitutional amendments, and there may
be "compelling state interests" for overriding those rights on some
occasions. It does mean that, barring reasons of national survival,
the grounds for the defeasibility of such rights must be at least as
38. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 75 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 66-70, 75.

40. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 285 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See Berger,
Some Aspects of Legal Reasoning Concerning Constitutionally Protected Rights, in LEGAL
REASONING: PROCEEDINGS OF THE WORLD CONGRESS FOR-LEGAL AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

(1971).

12-13
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basic as the rights overridden. These grounds are discovered by
attending to what the Constitution says. For example, the state
cannot justifiably abrogate or restrict the right to free speech unless
that abrogation is necessary to protect other basic rights such as the
right to a fair trial. Grounds for abrogation or restriction must be
serious circumstances that threaten comparable basic rights, for
example, and not simply the feeling of a judge that some imminent
tragedy will occur if free speech is permitted on a given occasion.
What is at stake are the very values of a free society for which the
framers adopted the Constitution and Bill of Rights. In criticizing
certain decisions as ad hoc Justices Black and Douglas are not concerned that constitutional rights are being ignored but that they are
not being given their proper preferred status. In their view, this
makes those decisions unprincipled. Of course, this claim requires
arguments that establish that the Constitution gives preferred status to these rights. These arguments are crucial, and I will return
to this issue of the priority ordering of principles later with reference
to philosophical arguments, not constitutional ones.
II.

AN EXAMPLE OF JUDICIAL REASONING IN A "HARD"

CASE

Defunis v. Odegaard4 ' provides a point of reference for discussing
the complexities of judicial reasoning. It is an excellent example of
a hard case in which there is a conflict of rights and principles,
presenting questions of balancing and priorities, invoking the notion
of a compelling state interest to order those priorities, and a debate
on the very meaning of the constitutional provision of equal protection.2 Only the barest facts of the now familiar case are required to
outline the basic issues of principle and relate them to the parameters and criteria of judicial reasoning discussed in Section 1 3
The University of Washington Law School denied Marco DeFunis
admission to a first year class restricted to approximately 150 students and for which there were roughly 1600 applicants. DeFunis
41. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
42. Paul Freund has characterized the equal protection clause as a moral standard put in
the wrappings of a legal command. P. FREUND, ON LAW AND JUSTICE 38-40 (1968). His remark
suggests that there is a fusion of legal and moral reasoning at this constitutional juncture.
Obviously, there are widely different interpretations of the clause.
43. The objective here is not to give a thorough analysis of DeFunis, with detailed facts
and a critique of the Washington Supreme Court's decision, but to use the case to demon.
strate the crucial principles and the complexities of judicial reasoning at this level for the
light that may be shed on the scope of judicial reasoning. Of course no final legal disposition
occurred as the Supreme Court declared the case moot. 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
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filed suit in state court, contending that the admissions commitee
violated his constitutional rights under the fourteenth amendment
by discriminating against him on the basis of race. He claimed that
a number of minority students were admitted whose credentials
(Law School Admissions Test and Predicted Grade Point Average)
were considerably lower than his own. DeFunis was admitted when
a mandatory injunction against the law school was granted by the
trial court. The Washington Supreme Court reversed, holding that
DeFunis' constitutional rights had not been violated." DeFunis
then appealed to the United States Supreme Court which stayed the
judgment of the Washington Supreme Court, permitting DeFunis to
continue in law school. When the United States Supreme Court
finally heard DeFunis' case he was in his final quarter of study. The
Court, deciding that DeFunis no longer needed a remedy, declared
the case moot.45
The facts in DeFunisare complex and are susceptible of different
interpretations. Certainly they may be read as discounting any racial (or reverse) discrimination against DeFunis. Such a reading
interprets the action of the committee in denying admission to DeFunis as one based on the fairness and appropriateness of invoking
non-standard criteria (letters, interviews, and the like) for minorities otherwise disadvantaged under the standard tests. On this reading, the same standards of merit were applied to majority and minority applicants although the indices of merit differ. This is exactly
the reading of DeFunis that Justice Douglas leaves open as the
correct reading in his dissent." Though racial classification was
used to identify applicants who might be disadvantaged by the
standard tests, race itself was not the dispositive factor in admitting
minority group members and excluding DeFunis. It was simply a
tool for assuring equality of treatment regardless of race, and its use
is perfectly consistent with the principle of nondiscrimination and
the Constitution.
Like Justice Douglas, I would not want to rule out this reading of
the facts of DeFunis. There is another reading of DeFunis, however,
in which race, though obviously not the only factor, was the dispositive one in admitting some applicants and in excluding DeFunis.
There are substantial grounds for inferring that the admissions com44. 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973).

45. 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
46. Id. at 325-26, 332-33 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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mittee admitted a number of minority students to the exclusion of
majority applicants like DeFunis who were by the law school's own
standards less qualified and who would have been rejected had they
been white. This was done to obtain a "reasonable representation"
of racial minority students. Such representation was deemed not
only to have pedagogical value but also was deemed necessary to
effect what the committee thought to be the "compelling state
interest" of overcoming the vestiges of past racism and helping to
assure a socially just society in the future. This reading of the case
raises the question of whether DeFunis' constitutional rights were
violated, for under this reading there is an overriding of DeFunis'
right to nondiscrimination or equality of treatment to effect greater
equality for minority members.
Actually two "compelling state interest" arguments can be extracted from DeFunisand from other cases in which the preferential
treatment of racial minorities is defended. One is that in which the
ultimate justifying premise is the norm of social justice for all, summarized above. Another is a utilitarian interpretation of
"compelling state interest." In the latter, preferential treatment is
justified on the ground that such policies maximize social welfare
and social utility. They improve the social and economic conditions
of the preferred group at little expense to the non-preferred. They
help end civil disorder, and society, it is suggested, benefits from the
policy.
That such preferential policies will maximize social utility is a
questionable empirical hypothesis. Justice Douglas, for example,
suggests that such policies will place a stigma of inferiority on minorities and hence may be self-defeating." My concern here, however, is not with these empirical issues, but with the constitutional
issues to which DeFunis gives rise and ultimately with the possible
fusion of moral and constitutional arguments or reasoning that
takes place at this level.
Three related but distinguishable constitutional issues emerge
from DeFunis: (1) the constitutional permissibility of racial classification; (2) the constitutional permissibility of racial discrimination
and, crucial to this issue, the question of constitutional grounds for
ascribing rights to groups or classes (blacks, women, chicanos, etc.)
as opposed to ascribing rights to individuals; and (3) constitutional
47. Id. at 343 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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grounds for overriding individual rights by a "compelling state
interest."
The first of these three issues needs only brief discussion. Racial
classification is not always invidious. Historically its use was nearly
totally indivious, but the Court has declared correctly, I believe,
that the use of racial classification is constitutionally permissible,
perhaps even required, in some contexts to effect social justice.
Equal protection is in no way violated when race is used to identify
persons who may be disadvantaged because of past institutionalized
injustice and who, because of that, deserve compensatory treatment. Nor is it violated when race is used to assure equality of
treatment in the distribution of some public resource such as education. This is what happened in the key desegregation cases in which
race was not used to apportion some benefit to members of one race
and exclude those of another but to assure equal benefits for all.4"
In contradistinction, the second reading of the facts of DeFunis
concludes that racial classification was used to exclude DeFunis
from certain benefits in order to pursue other more compelling
objectives.
Assuming arguendo this second reading of the facts of DeFunislet
us focus on issues (2) and (3). These obviously are related. If there
is a compelling state reason for violating a person's individual
rights, then discrimination against a person on the basis of race
might be justified for that reason. We will attend to the two compelling state interest arguments mentioned above in a moment. First
note that both of the compelling state interest arguments-(a) we
must overcome the effects of past injustice and develop a racially
just society and, for that purpose, the temporary violation of DeFunis' right to nondiscrimination is justified, and (b) we must end
civil disorder and maximize social utility and, for this purpose, the
temporary violation of DeFunis's right to nondiscrimination is justified-may well presuppose the ascription of rights to groups as opposed to individuals. Although DeFunis is not an affirmative action
case in the sense of mandated quotas or numerical goals of admission of minority members, still it may be argued that in seeking
overall racial justice, the admissions committee and the Washington Supreme Court acted on the basis of what they thought were the
interests of a racial group.
48. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green v. County
School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
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Professor Cornelius Golightly explicitly argues that the theory of
rights that underlies affirmative action requirements is one in which
rights are ascribed to groups as opposed to individuals. 9 The premise of those requirements, he believes, with emphasis on overcoming
"underutilization" of members of certain groups and the use of
numerical goals and timetables that sometimes become specific
quotas, is that we accord special rights to entire classes of persons
(blacks, women, American Indians and so on) who have not been
able to enter the mainstream of American life because of past and
current discrimination. According to Golightly, this is contrary to
the fourteenth amendment, the thrust of which is nondiscrimination, and which vests rights in individuals, not in groups.
Emphasis on group rights and emphasis on individual rights are two
different "political moralities" that clash in some circumstances.
The group-rights emphasis permits the overriding of individual
rights in the interest of a given group or groups; nonmembers of
certain favored groups are justifiably discriminated against simply
because of nonmembership in the group(s), whether the group be
defined in terms of sex, race, or some other characteristic. A DeFunis who has been discriminated against on the basis of a grouprights emphasis has no grounds to complain, given the acceptance
of the group-rights premise which has been required by the recalcitrance of society to bring oppressed minorities into the equal opportunity mainstream within the traditional individual-rights basis.
Golightly declares: "His complaints about the fitness or unfitness
of the Black nationality individual who has received preferential
treatment is simply out of order. Stated in another way and in the
idiom of familiar logical theory, it is a violation of the theory of
logical types to intermingle the morality of individual rights and the
morality of group rights."5 1Once racism is overcome, the individualrights emphasis will return. At that time, a DeFunis will have a
legitimate complaint. Until that time, he has none.
Several things must be noted about the role of the group-rights
emphasis in the law and in the decisions of the University of Washington admissions committee and the Washington Supreme Court.
The legislation out of which affirmative action programs grew does
not legalize group rights per se. The Civil Rights Act of 1964,1' the
49. Golightly, Justice and "Discriminationfor" in HigherEducation, 1 PHIL.
(1974).
50. Id. at 13.
51. 28 U.S.C. § 1447; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-1975d, 2000a-2000h-6 (1970).

EXCHANGE

5

1976]

LEGAL REASONING

337

Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,52 and the affirmative
action program that came into existence under Executive Order
11246 1 all seem to reflect faithfully the nondiscrimination requirement that has been taken by many to be the thrust of the fourteenth
amendment. There is little doubt, however, that considerable discrimination on the basis of group characteristics such as race and
sex has occurred as a result of the administration of programs that
followed this legislation. Although affirmative action requires that
employers recruit, hire, train, and promote persons in all job classifications without regard to race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and that "good faith" efforts be made to correct identifiable
"deficiencies," (defined as the existence of fewer minorities or
women in a particular job classification than would be reasonably
expected by their availability)," some employers exceeded these
bounds. The recent case of McAleer v. AT& T Co.," in which a man
successfully sued the company charging that he had been unfairly
denied promotion to a supervisor's job because of discrimination in
favor of women, may be an instance of exceeding those bounds in
the very process of trying to fulfill a consent decree with the government to hire more women. AT & T tried to walk a tightrope between
the requirements of the consent decree and those of nondiscrimination. If the requirements of such a consent decree do in
fact mandate the hiring of specific quotas from a given group, they
contradict the principle of nondiscrimination. The company could
not possibly satisfy both demands. If the decree specifies goals that
are to be attempted within the nondiscrimination principle, the
demands are consistent. Golightly doubts that there is a distinguishable difference between quotas, goals, and timetables. Moreover, he sees affirmative action programs as a response, historically
and politically, to the pressures brought mainly by black groups to
overcome the oppression of their group. The vesting of special rights
in the oppressed black group rather than simply in black individuals
is the result of an agreement between blacks as a minority group and
52. 5 U.S.C. §§ 5108, 5314, 5315, 5316; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 2000e-1 to -6, 2000e-8, 2000e-9,
2000e-13 to e-17 (Supp. I, 1972).
53. 3 C.F.R. 169 (1974).
54. Affirmative Action Programs came into existence with Executive Order 11246, id.
Requirements for these programs are found in 41 C.F.R. 228-37 (1976). The requirements are
reprinted with an introduction by P. Brownstein in EQuAL EMPLOYMENT OPPoa'ruNrIYRESPONSIBILITIES, RIGHTS, REMEDIES, Appendix C (J. Pemberton ed., PLI, Sourcebook 8,
1974).
55. 416 F. Supp. 435 (D.D.C. 1976).
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whites as a majority group. 6
I cannot agree with this analysis of either the law undergirding
affirmative action, if taken in any literal sense, or of the historical
events that preceded this law. I think, however, that the grouprights emphasis does play an important role in cases like DeFunis,
not at the statutory level where the law on equal employment opportunities demands strict compliance with the principle of nondiscrimination (even if the implementors of that law demand something contrary), but at the constitutional level. In DeFunis, for example, statutory law was not cited as a ground for the preferential
admissions program for minorities, though various precedents in
common law were cited. The grounds cited were constitutional. The
Washington Supreme Court argued that the Constitution permits
preferential treatment for disadvantaged minority groups even if
that preference results in the denial of a benefit to someone like
DeFunis who would have received the benefit of admission were it
not for the minority admissions policy. The rationale was that preferential treatment was required to accomplish the overriding or
compelling state interest of the elimination of racial imbalance
within both legal education and the legal profession, thereby attempting to eliminate the effects of past racial discrimination by
assuring access to the judicial process by minorities. At this level of
adjudication, Golightly is correct. Group rights are pitted against
the rights of an individual like DeFunis. We must ask whether the
Constitution permits the ascription of rights to groups as opposed
to individuals and, if it does, whether and under what conditions it
also permits group rights to override individual rights.
It is important to distinguish the question of whether group classification is permissible from that of ascribing rights or modes of
treatment on the basis of that classification. I have argued above
that the former is constitutionally permissible but that the latter is
problematic. This is not to say that constitutionally there can be no
group rights. Obviously there are group rights in the sense of the
rights of collective entities like corporations that represent many
persons but which are legal individuals. Moreover there are group
rights in yet a stronger sense when membership in a group is so
central that it directly affects in vital ways each member of the
group and when there is a recognized spokesman for the group. Boris
Bittker suggests that this situation characterizes the various Indian
56. Golightly, supra note 49, at 12.
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tribes, but he denies that it is true of blacks as a group." If it were
true, some form of group treatment in compensation or distribution
of goods, services, and opportunities might be a proper way of assuring equal protection. Because it is not true, group treatment often
will violate equal protection. Not only are the boundaries of the
class of blacks difficult if not impossible to establish precisely given
the high proportion of interracial breeding, but also compensatory
and distributive policies that operate on the basis of race or sex will
result in great injustice. The concept of compensation requires that
redress be paid by the party guilty of perpetrating an injury and
that the amount of the redress be proportionate to the injury suffered. The disadvantaged condition of many blacks today is an enormous burden. For many other blacks, that is not the case. Furthermore, the individual or collective parties who perpetuated the injury
are, for the most part, dead and gone. This is not to deny that much
sub rosa racism and sexism continues to operate in our society; nor
is it to deny that strong measures must be taken to stop such practices and to rectify the disadvantaged conditions inherited by many
persons. But if the method of compensation and distribution is a
blanket policy of preference on the basis of race or sex, the effect is
to exact redress from majority members who are not guilty of
wrongdoing and, in many cases, to award compensation to minority
group members who have escaped the disadvantaging effects of past
institutionalized injustice. Additionally, there is the problem of adjudicating between different groups who claim disadvantaged status
as groups, for example, between blacks, women, and chicanos, if
there is conflict between their claims to certain opportunities"
This discussion returns to the compelling state interest arguments
and to the meaning of equal protection. Ignoring for present purposes the utilitarian interpretation of that argument specified
above, there are two interpretations of the compelling state interest
argument that rest on the appeal to social justice or equal protection. One interpretation is that although the preferential policy is
injurious to DeFunis and although his right to nondiscrimination in
the sense of the uniform application of the same meritocratic criteria of admission to all was violated, that violation was justified in
order to attain long-term social justice for all. On this reading De57. B. BnrrKER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS 73 (1973).
58. See Watkins, Will It Be Blacks vs. Women for Faculty Jobs?, The Chronicle of Higher
Educ., Oct. 23, 1973, at 1.
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Funis' right to equal protection was violated in the interest of equal
protection for others, a disadvantaged group in particular. Given
this interpretation the question comes to this: Does the Constitution
permit the violation of the right to equal protection of some persons
to instantiate that same right for others?
It is difficult to think of a compelling state interest grounded in
the appeal to equal protection in which equal protection for others
is violated. Chief Justice Burger has argued that no state law has
"satisfied this seemingly insurmountable standard."59 It seems insurmountable on a federal level as well. If national survival is at
stake, perhaps such a violation would be justified. Here social justice would be pitted against a generically different value, national
survival itself, though of course poor judgments about what is required for survival may be made." But under this, interpretation,
Justice Douglas' dissent in DeFunis is particularly relevant: "If
discrimination based on race is constitutionally permissible when
those who hold the reins can come up with 'compelling' reasons to
justify it, then constitutional guarantees acquire an accordionlike
quality."' Douglas makes it clear that the effect of such preferential
treatment is the undermining of the entire principle of equal protection, and it seems to me that he is correct.
A second possible reading of the compelling state interest argument in DeFunis is grounded in the appeal to equal protection. This
reading might be proposed as a defense of the Washington Supreme
Court's decision to exclude DeFunis and as one that denies that
DeFunis's right to equal protection was violated. I have in mind
Ronald Dworkin's distinction between the right of equal treatment
and the right to be treated as an equal; 2 the latter is the generic
meaning of the equal protection clause and the former is
"derivative." Speaking specifically about DeFunis and issues at
stake, Dworkin warns us "not to use the equal protection clause to
cheat ourselves of equality." 3 The fundamental meaning of equal
protection, he declares, is that each person be treated as an equal
with the "same respect and concern." The right to equal treatment,
on the other hand, is the right to the equal distribution of some
59. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363-64 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
60. Some feel such a judgment was made in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944).
61. 416 U.S. 312, 343 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
62. Dworkin, The DeFunis Case: The Right to Go to Law School, N.Y. Rev. of Books, Feb.
5, 1976, at 29, 30.
63. Id. at 33.
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resource, opportunity, or burden. The right to equal treatment is
sometimes but not always required by the right to be treated as an
equal. In DeFunis the fundamental right at stake was the right to
be treated as an equal. This was accorded to DeFunis, Dworkin
believes, in spite of his exclusion. DeFunis' application and his
interests were treated as fully and sympathetically as the interests
of any other.6 The right to equal treatment of distribution was
denied DeFunis, but this did not violate his right to be treated as
an equal and therefore did not violate his right to equal protection
under the fourteenth amendment. Dworkin's claim can also be put
in this way: Unless unequal distribution takes place, the right of
minority members to be treated as equals will be violated; -or, equal
protection for all requires the preferential treatment of racial minorities which in turn requires justifiable discrimination against nonpreferred persons and an overriding of their rights to equal treatment. The right to equal treatment is simply a derivative right that
normally holds but which does not hold in circumstances in which
there are many members of racial minority groups who are disadvantaged because of past and present injustice. Discrimination
against DeFunis, in the sense of unequal treatment, does not violate
DeFunis''right to be treated as an equal. Thus, in regard to the
constitutional issues at stake in DeFunis,Dworkin is suggesting that
the case is one in which a higher order right or principle, within the
generic meaning of equal protection, overrides a lower order right.
If what Dworkin means by the right to equal treatment is the right
to identicaltreatment or the same treatment, one surely must grant
him the distinction he draws between the right to equal treatment
and the right to be treated as an equal. One must agree that the
right to the same distribution is a secondary or derivative right when
it holds, and that it holds or is required only when entailed by the
principle of equality. Equality or non-discrimination does not require that we ignore relevant differences that justify differential
treatment. To the contrary, it requires that we attend to those differences and then accord differential or proportional treatment. Although historically there have been sharp differences of opinion
about the criteria that justify differential treatment and how much
differentiation they justify, the emphasis on proportionality as
opposed to sameness of distribution goes back at least to Aristotle,
who declared that "equals are to be treated equally; unequals un64. Id. at 30.
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equally." This is the commonplace interpretation of the principle of
nondiscrimination. Nondiscrimination permits differential treatment when relevant differences exist.
Apparently this commonplace interpretation is not what Dworkin
is addressing by his distinction and argument. Rather he seems to
be arguing that the right to nondiscrimination is derivative and can
be overridden by the right to be treated as an equal. At least the
right to nondiscrimination can be overridden when a person's
"vital" interests are not at stake: "Individuals may have a right to
equal treatment in elementary education, because someone who is
denied elementary education is unlikely to lead a useful life. But
legal education is not so vital that everyone has an equal right to
be admitted.16 5 In his discussion of DeFunis Dworkin does not spell
out criteria for "vital" interests. DeFunis himself obviously thought
that admission to his state's major law school was a vital interest
because he planned to practice in that state. But the important
point is that Dworkin seems to be saying not simply that differential
treatment is justified when there are relevant differences, but that
the principle of nondiscrimination, at least in regard to non-vital
interests, can be violated justifiably by appealing to the more generic meaning of equal protection-the right to be treated as an
equal. What I am suggesting is that the distinction drawn by Dworkin and the argument used to defend the Washington Supreme
Court's decision to uphold the exclusion of DeFunis break down. Are
we treating DeFunis as an equal when we discriminate against him
on racial criteria? Are not the interests of anyone who is excluded
from admission, employment, and promotion simply because of race
being relegated to secondary status? I think they are. His interests
are adversely affected because of his race, and he is not being.
treated as an equal. Violation of his right to nondiscrimination is
equivalent to violation of his right to be treated as an equal.
The rejection of Dworkin's distinction and his argument does not
mean that one cannot give priority to one right as opposed to
another. Thomas Nagel, for example, suggests that under certain
circumstances the right of one person not to be economically disadvantaged may justify the violation of the right of another person to
have meritocratic standards of access to positions uniformly applied."6 This suggestion pits one rule of justice against another and
65. Id.
66. Nagel, Equal 7eatment and Compensatory Discrimination,2 PHIL. & PUBLIC AFFAIRS
348 (1973).
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assigns a certain priority under certain circumstances. Although
Nagel's suggestion was made in the context of discussing what
might be permitted within a philosophical theory of justice, the
same priority perhaps could be defended within a constitutional
theory. Just as Nagel does not invoke race as the dispositive factor
in granting the priority but rather invokes the greater injustice of
the continuation of the disadvantaged condition of certain persons,
so also a constitutional theory might justify the same priority without invoking race as the dispositive factor. I have no such fully
developed constitutional theory at hand to justify such a priority,
but the provision of the fourteenth amendment that there shall be
no deprivation of life without due process of law6" is, however, a
possible constitutional ground for according certain special rights to
the disadvantaged. If such rights are ascribed on that basis and not
on the basis of race or sex, there need be no conflict with equal
protection."
This discussion of the different possible interpretations of the
facts of DeFunis and the different interpretations of the complex
principles applicable to the case illustrates the difficulty in applying the criteria developed in Section I to a hard case. The difficulty
exists, at least in part, because complex moral and legal principles
are intertwined in a case like DeFunis. The remaining task is to
discuss the fusion of moral and legal reasoning and to indicate how
the criteria are applicable to cases such as DeFunis.

mH.

THE FUSION OF MORAL AND LEGAL REASONING

DeFunisis an example of those hard cases that take us to the very
boundaries of our jurisprudence. At those boundaries there is a fusion of moral and legal reasoning, and interpretations of constitutional principles such as equal protection are cast in terms of the
judge's grasp of the political and moral philosophy that provides the
background for those principles. Those interpretations, along with
the value priorities that he sees within the Constitution, are ultimately of the greatest magnitude for the legal system because they
determine to a large extent the judge's decisions at other levels.
Some judges are far better at grasping that moral and political
67. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
68. For discussion of the due process clause as a basis for "minimum protection" see
Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term. Foreword: On Protecting the PoorThrough the
Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1969).
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philosophy and applying it to the changing conditions of society
than are others.
The interpretation of constitutional principles and a grasp of the
moral and political backdrop of those principles are one thing. A
philosophical defense of those principles is something else. This is
a task that is beyond the role of the judge qua judge, but we might
observe briefly some changes in the philosophical terrain on the
possibility of such a defense such as John Rawls' A THEORY OF
JUSTICE. 6' It is well known that a number of contemporary moral and
legal philosophers deny that a set of values or principles of justice
hierarchically ordered can be demonstrated with any degree of finality to all rational minds. They agree that reasons can be given for
value preferences up to a point, but as Ludwig Wittgenstein says,
"[i]f I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock,
and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: 'This is simply
what I do.' "70 Hans Kelsen's legal positivism leaves fundamental
legal norms as unprovable assumptions, as perhaps expressions of
basic preferences. 7' R.M. Hare states that all that can be done in a
regressive justification is "the complete specification of the way(s)
72
of life" of which alternative decisions of principle are a part.
What is intriguing about John Rawls' mammouth contribution
to the theory of justice and to moral philosophy in general is the reentry of the view that a theory of justice with a hierarchically or
lexically ordered set of principles that is acceptable and provable to
all rational minds is possible. 73 Rawls would agree that a Nietzschean, for example, may have "turned his spade"-to use Wittgenstein's phrase-in opting for his particular version of a meritocracy
with its concomitant-concept of justice, and hence he may be impervious to further argument. This does not mean, however, that a
common methodological procedure for adjudicating between fundamentally different theories of justice is impossible. We are not reduced to simply describing alternative ways of life and choosing
between them.
Both Rawls' methodological procedure for arriving at principles
69. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
70. L. WrrrENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 217 at 85 (1953).
71. H. KELSEN, GENERL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (1945); H. KELSEN, WHAT IS JUSTICE?
(1957).
72. HARE, supra note 8, at 68-69. Hare insists that we cannot call the choice of a way of
life based on this complete specification an arbitrary one. The use of the term "arbitrary" in
such a context would have no meaning, for by definition no further reasons can be given.
73. RAwLS, supra note 69 (especially Chapters 3 and 4).
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of justice and his substantive theory or set of principles have been
subjected to a barrage of criticism in legal and philosophical periodicals." His method, the use of a hypothetical social contract in
which rational, self-interested (but not egoistic) persons choose a set
of lexically ordered principles behind a veil of ignorance designed
to assure objectivity and impartiality, is not unproblematic. Nor is
the substantive theory of justice that emerges an unproblematic one
(the lexical priority of the principle of equal liberty over the principle of fair equal opportunity and the difference principle). These
problems cannot be analyzed here. But Rawls' theory goes against
the trend by affirming the possibility of a rationally defensible ideal
theory of justice.
DeFunis demonstrates that the answer to the question of what
sorts of relevant considerations a judge must include in order to
have a framework for adequate judicial decisions is complex, but it
also supports the criteria developed in Section I. There are layers
of relevant considerations. Stare decisis and consistency are necessary but are by no means sufficient considerations, as DeFunis, a
case of first impression, illustrates. Existing legal rules and precedents may be overturned, but when they are, the judge or court must
be able to show or to argue rationally that the changed or overturned
rule is justified by reference to a basic right or principle or the
preferred status of certain rights or principles as embodied in the
Constitution. But as the discussion of DeFunisshows, basic rights
and principles are subject to different interpretations. The judge
must bring to bear an interpretation of those principles and rights
and a theory of constitutional priorities, but his idiosyncratic standards cannot be the justifying ground. If they were, the very concept
of legal obligation would become so fluid that it would be nearly
meaningless. The judge must respect the autonomous and separate
role of legislative bodies, but that respect does not mean a defense
of the status quo. As DeFunis illustrates with respect to the need
for minority group members in the legal professions, the judge must
be sensitive to new social science data that are ultimately relevant
to the proper application of constitutional principles. Additionally,
he must exercise a balancing function in the context of conflicts of
rights, such as the right to equal protection, attending to whatever
priorities are embodied in the Constitution or his interpretation of
those priorities.
74. Bibliographies of articles on Rawls are included in READiNG RAWLS (Daniels ed. 1975)
and 3 Soc. Tmnoav & PRAc. 149 (1974).
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All of these considerations are relevant to adequate judicial decision making, especially at higher court levels. Even without the
additional burden of devising a philosophical or ideal theory of justice (though such a theory may come into play in his interpretation
of the Constitution) the task of the judge is immensely complex and
difficult, and as Aristotle points out in the NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, we
should expect only the degree of certainty which a given subject
matter permits. 5 Judicial reasoning, especially in hard cases such
as DeFunis, unquestionably does not permit absolute certainty. The
very nature of judicial problems beyond the simplistic rule-oriented
stage, that is, conflicting interpretations of the facts of a case, conflicting precedents in common law and conflicting interpretations of
the principles at stake in those precedents, conflicting interpretations of various statutes, conflicting interpretations of rights and
principles at the constitutional level and of priorities among those
principles, precludes that sort of certainty. The judge must live with
this uncertainty and must decide in which direction the balance
seems to point.
75. Even if Rawls is correct in his claim that an Archimedian point is possible in a theory

of justice which, when adopted at the constitutional level, provides a strict lexical ordering
of principles, still there would be conflicts of liberties or rights within the lexically ordered
principles requiring balancing decisions; for the principle of equal liberty itself, his principle
of highest priority, embraces a cluster of liberties that may conflict with one another.

